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STATE~lliNT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in Appellant's 
Brief are substantially correct and as 
stipulated to and as sl1own by the various 
instruments admitted as evidence. An 
action was canmenoed by C. G. Green in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County 
against E. E. Garn and his wife, Cleo v. 
Gam, on the 7th day Qf February, 1949, 
and upon the seme day a writ of attachment 
was issued out of the Third District Court 
against said Garn; and it is admitted that 
at the time~ of the filing of the suti, Garn 
was the owner or a Buick automobile sub .. 
jeot to a lien or the Bradshaw Chevrolet 
Company of Cedar City, Utah. On the lOth 
day of February, 1949, and prior to the 
time of service of summons or writ o£ attach~ 
ment upon Garn in \~fashington County. Ga~n 
sold his equity in the said Buick automObile 
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to the Plaintiff in this action, the Re-
~ondent in this Appeal, as part payment 
upon a truck. At that time the truok was 
delivered to Gam, who lived in Santa Clara, 
Washington County, Utah, approxim,ately six 
miles "!~est of St. George, and they lett 
the Buick in the Respondent's possession 
(Appellant's Brief' erroneously states that 
the Buick was left in Appellant's ·possession) 
until on or about the 17th day of February 
when Garns brought the said truck back to 
Respondent's Garage in St. George for re• 
pairs and Respondent let Garns take the 
Buick to drive to their home in Santa Clara 
until the truck was repaired. 
On the same day, to-wit, the 17th day 
of February, after the Garns had gone home 
in the Buick and left the truck for re.-
pairs with Respondent, the ,Sheriff served a 
summons and writ of attaanment upon them 
and took said Buick into his possession. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. 4 ~ 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
I~ That the provisions of the Motor 
Vehicle Act under the, Utah Statutes is 
not controlling as between buyer and sel-
ler or Motor Vehicles. 
II. The judgment allowing attorney 
fees was not erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
That the provisions of tb.e Iv1otor Ve-
hicle Act under the Utah Statutes is not 
controlling as between buyer and seller 
of Motor Vehicles. 
The trial C~ourt in the instant case, 
see Findings No. 6 and 7, held that on 
the 7th day of February. 1949, at the time 
of the filing of the action by Appellant 
Green ~za1~st E. E. Garn and Cleo v. Garn, 
his wife,in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake City, the said E. E. Garn and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 5 -
and Cleo V. Garn were the registered own• 
ers of the Buick automobile involved in 
this case on the records of the Utat State 
Tax Commission, the said records showing 
a lien on said automobile by the Bradshaw 
Chevrolet Company of Cedar City, ·Utah; that 
on February lOth, 1949, the said E. E. Garn 
and his wife, sold the said Buick automobile 
to the Respondent hf;lrein as ·part payment 
upon a truck which he at that time pur-
chased from said Respondent; that Gam and 
his wife at that time delivered said FJuick 
automobile to Respondent and was given pos• 
session of said truck. 
This was a bona fide transaction. Re-
spondent becta.111e the owner of the said Buick 
automobile subject only to the lien of the 
Bradshaw Cl1evrolet Company of Cedar City, 
Utah end at the time of the attachment by 
Defendant Prince, at the instanoe of .Appel• 
lant Green, on the 17th day of February, 
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1949, the said E. E. Garn &lld Cleo V. 
Garn, his wife, h$d no interest in said 
Buick automobile. 
It the language of Section 57-3a•72 
of the i"1otor Vehicle Law of the Statutes 
of Uteh, 1943 was controlling and had to 
be literally followed. we submit that it 
would destroy the whole automobile industry 
in the State of Utah, except in Salt Lake 
City or the innrediate vicinity, ·where the 
buyer and seller of automobiles could both 
go to the Motor Vehicle Department in the 
Capitol Building, there wesent their 
various instruments of title and transfer 
and have the transaction cornpleted a.t that 
time. In all other parts of the State no 
person V¥D uld dare purcha,se an a.u tomobi le, 
either new or used, because the mechanics 
of transfer of title would take time, 
either days or longer, during which. time 
any cr,edi tor of the seller could file an 
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an action and attach said automobile 
whether it ~ere in the possession of the 
buyer or some innocent person to ~hom 1t 
had been sold, and have the same held un-
til the t2rmination of the suit, and then 
sell the same to apply proceeds upon the 
judgment obtained. No purchaser would 
dare buy an automobile from a dealer or 
anyone else, either new or used, regard• 
less of what the certificate of title 
ahowed; and no deal. er would dare receive 
a second-hand car~upon purchase of a new 
car regardless of t!1e showing upon the 
certificate of title. 
It is our position that no such inter-
pretation could or should be imposed upon 
Section 57-3a-72 because such an interpre-
tation would be contrary to good business, 
~uld 'ham-string' the automobile industry 
in the State ot Utah, especially outside 
of Salt Lake City, and is not necessary to 
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ot the various parties involved. 
Our Supreme Gourt has held in Jackson 
vs. James, 97 Utah 41 and 89 Pacific 2d 
235 ttnder Section 3 upon ~)age 237 r£ 89 
Pacific 2d as follows: 
"It seems therefore that Section 
71 (now Section 72) is not to be con-
strued, as contended by Appellant,.as 
absolute and n:ande.tory to pass a title, 
In the light of the 'Jtll~1ole chapter it 
is evident that its provisions were 
written to 1;;:r')otect ir...nocent purchasers 
and third parties from fraud but that 
it was not intended to be controlling 
as between the ~rties of the trans• 
action. It may 1Nell be doubted that 
the Legislature could make mandatory 
any such formalities as a prerequisite 
to transfer of title as betwea1 the 
parties." 
There is no questio~ but that on February 
lOth, E. E Garn and Cleo v. Garn. his wife, 
a·.:~ ned said Buick automobile subject to 
the lien of the Bradshaw Chevrolet Company 
and upon said day they sold the same by 
a bona fide transaction -to the Respondent 
Clarence Dah~, d/b/a Dixie Motors; that 
Garns title was transferred to said Re-
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spondent and that n'C that time possession 
of the.Buick was delivered to Respondent 
who at tb.c same time delivered possession 
of a truck to G·arns upon said transaction. 
Certainly the parties to the transaction 
at that time were Garn and Dahl, the Re~ 
spondant herein, and the Supreme Court 
said, as quoted above~ that said Section 
72 was not intended to be controlling as 
between the parties to the transaction • .;;/" 
The Supreme Court in the case above 
quoted has given a reasonable interpre-
tation of said Section 72, one that will 
promote business and will not 'ham-string t 
or stifle the same and an interpretation 
that will permit citizens of the State to 
buy and sell au tornobiles the same as they 
can buy any other property. 
Fo~ the sake of brevity counsel will 
not discuss the many cases cited b1 
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counsel for Appellant because we feel 
that they are obviously not i11 <lpoint and 
' 
we do urge that Jackson vs. James cited 
above is •made to order' for the present 
e-ase. 
It 
allowing attorney fees 
was not in error. 
Tt -~,...... 
- ...L~ t 1-- ("::'- co~""~-· ., a~ r' ...L .ti.l~;. .. u • ..:;) ... L C< . .L ... v e.nd the 
r:1ea.d1ngs Ol~. behnlf of Respondent in. this 
u~ ~· ·~i-
mattcr do n6t request attorney fees. This 
If' l ,. '>~ ' 
t:::i al of tt.\.G caso 1 at 1JvLLi cl1 tirne Ees por1da1 t 
as1~ed ft.~r attorney fees and, e.s .facts 0t 
11.0 hearj_;ng \?nS l1ed tb.ePe,.. 
afte:L'' .c;~ __ d 11.0 formal motio.n VHJS r0ade to cr0.end 
t1J.C I1J.eadings tc Teq~est attorney fees • 
Res~l'Jr1de11t contends tl1:?t he is anti tled to 
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attorney fees in .!ch.is lLlB.tter. His property 
was take11 e.wa:r from hi1c a:t.Ld l1e \vas co1n-
~)elled to pey tl1o attorney fees e.llowed by 
"-• but 1!~l1e:~e the v·rong is of 
such character that the proper pro-
tection of his richts requires Plain~ 
till to eL1ploy co·unsel to gain redress, 
it has been held th.at Plaintiff rrtay 
recover reasonable counsel fees as an 
element of demage." 
25 c.J.s. page 233 
Malloy V& Carroll, 191 N.E. 661 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The sale of the Buick automobile in 
question in this case wes made on Febru-
ary lOth, 1949 by one E. E. Garn and 
Cleo v. Garn, l1is \Vife, to tl'1e Respondent 
herein. This was a bona fide transaction 
in the due course of business and the 
equity in said Buick automobile, possedsed 
by Garn, passed to Respondent subject only 
to the lien of the Bradshaw Chevro~ Company 
of Cedar City, Utah. Attachment by the 
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the Appellarlts of said Buiclt automobile 
one v.Tce:~ later could only prevail as to 
Cnrn' s interest in said autolfi·-Jbile at tl1at 
tinE vhich., of course, was nill. v_:e s·ub• 
r:1i t the!'tefo-re the.t the judgment of the 
lower Court should be sustained. 
In as much ns Respondent was c.on!pelled 
to employ an attorney to protect his rights 
from wrongful attacb~ent, even though by 
' 
an action in replevin, 1ve contend tr.l.at 
attorney fees were properly awarded and 
that the judgment allowing same in the 
lower Court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PICI\:ETT 1-\ND PICKETT 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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